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FRANCHISING IN THE UNITED STATES
Honey V. Gandhi*
INTRODUCTION
ENERALLY, most people associate franchising with fast food
restaurants such as Subway, McDonald's, and Burger King. This
is not surprising, because the restaurant industry is among the
oldest and the most successful trades still operating under the franchising
format. While restaurants and other food-related businesses represent a
large segment of the total franchised businesses in America, the franchis-
ing model has become common and widespread in a diverse array of busi-
ness services and industries.' Today, franchises span many areas of the
U.S. economy, including but not limited to, hotel, automotive, real estate,
personal and business services, convenience and retail businesses, educa-
tion and children development activities, maintenance and domestic ser-
vices, and fitness and health services. 2
The Washington, D.C.-based International Franchise Association
(IFA), the world's oldest and largest organization representing franchis-
ing worldwide, foresees a positive outlook for the U.S. franchising indus-
try.3 The IFA reports that in 2000, the franchising sector had accounted
for more than 40 percent of all U.S. retail sales, with revenue collection of
more than a trillion dollars per year from seventy-five different indus-
tries.4 The industry analysts further reported that the franchising industry
has witnessed rapid growth, with a new franchise opening in the country
every eight minutes. 5 Even with the harsh economy and skeptical busi-
ness climate of the past few years, the franchising model continues to be a
very strong and resilient business format that generates jobs and contrib-
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1. Tracy Stapp Herold, Top Food Franchises, ENTREPRENEUR (July 5, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/226750#.
2. See id.
3. The Entrepreneur's Source-Answers to the IFA's 21 Most Frequently Asked Ques-
tions about Franchising, INT'L FRANCHISE Ass'N, 1, 9-11, available at http:/
www.nextaff.com/resourcecenters/business/Franchising%20FAQs.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2014).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id.
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utes positively to North America's GDP.6 The franchise sector contrib-
uted approximately $472 billion to the U.S. GDP in 2013 and is estimated
to contribute even more in 2014. 7 Moreover, it also accounted for ap-
proximately 8.3 million jobs in the United States in 2013 and is estimated
to create an additional 192,000 new jobs in 2014. 8 According to the Inter-
national Franchise Association, the outlook for the franchise sector in
2014 not only looks positive, but the industry is also predicted to outpace
growth in other business sectors this year as well.9
This article surveys the various laws applicable for franchising in the
United States. Part I provides a brief understanding of the meaning and
history of franchising. Part II examines the statutory franchising laws,
both at the federal and the state level. Part III explores the interplay
between franchising and other laws, such as antitrust and intellectual
property laws. Part IV discusses an emerging issue about whether fran-
chisees are independent contractors or employees of the franchisor. Fi-
nally, Part V presents an overview of the termination and post-
termination issues arising in the franchising context.
I. FRANCHISING-MEANING & HISTORY
A. WHAT Is FRANCHISING?
With the explosive growth of franchised businesses and the evolving
practice of franchise law, franchising can be categorized as an industry in
all respects. Franchising is technically not an industry, but a business for-
mat-a tried and tested method of distributing goods and services. The
International Franchise Association defines franchising as:
[A] method of distributing products or services. At least two levels
of people are involved in a franchise system: (1) the franchisor, who
lends his trademark or trade name and a business system; and (2) the
franchisee, who pays a royalty and often an initial fee for the right to
do business under the franchisor's name and system.' 0
Usually, a franchising arrangement is stipulated by way of an agree-
ment whereby the franchisor provides the franchisee the right to use his
business format, operating methods, and intellectual property, such as
signs, logos, trademarks or trade names, to distribute a product or service
6. See 2014 Franchise Business Economic Outlook, INT'L FRANCHISE ASS'N, Jan.
2014, available at http://franchiseeconomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
FranchiseBusinessOutlook_- January_2014-1-13-13.pdf; Slow, Steady Growth to
Continue for Franchise Businesses in 2013, INT'L FRANCHISE ASS'N (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.franchise.org/Franchise-News-Detail.aspx?id=5891.
7. 2014 Franchise Business Economic Outlook, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Frequently Asked Questions About Franchising-Answers To The 19 Most Com-
monly Asked Questions About Franchising, INT'L FRANCHISE Ass'N, http:I/
www.franchise.org/franchiseesecondary.aspx?id=10008 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
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in exchange for fees and royalties. 1
Various styles of business franchising exist. The more common type of
franchising involves using the franchisor's business format.' 2 But
franchising also includes product distribution.13 Under the business for-
mat franchising, as the name suggests, the franchisee adopts the complete
method to operate the business, including its format, operations manuals,
marketing plans, and distribution techniques. For example, Taco Bell
sells its complete business operations format to its franchisees. 14 On the
other hand, the product distribution franchisor does not provide the fran-
chisee with the complete business format to run it, but rather the
franchisor licenses his trademark and logo to the franchisee for distribu-
tion of the product. For example, Coca Cola licenses with bottlers to
manufacture the drink using its secret formula and distribute it under its
trademark. 15 Further, a franchisor can restrict the franchisee's opera-
tional activity to that of either a single-unit franchise or a multi-unit
franchise.' 6 Single-unit franchise agreements grant the franchisee the
right to open and operate one franchise unit versus a multi-unit agree-
ment, which allows the franchisee to open and operate more than one
unit within a specified area.' 7
B. HISTORY OF FRANCHISING
The franchising concept came into existence in mid-1800s with the dis-
tribution techniques adopted by Isaac Singer, the founder of Singer Sew-
ing Company) 8 Singer, widely considered to be the father of modern-
day franchising, was one of the first to develop franchise contracts with
the aim to distribute his sewing machines over a widespread geographic
area. He contracted with local salesmen, granting them the right to sell
his machines within a specifically defined region in exchange for a licens-
ing fee.' 9 With the economic and infrastructural growth and the increase
in the mobility of Americans in the early to mid-1900s, a wide variety of
retail establishments and restaurants picked up on this licensing concept
and started to formally develop franchises-for example, Kentucky Fried
Chicken in 1952, Burger King in 1954, McDonald's in 1955, and Pizza Hut
11. Howard Yale Lederman, Franchising and the Franchise Law-An Introduction, 92
MICH. BAR J., 34, 34 (Jan. 2013) available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/
pdf4article2150.pdf.




14. Id. at 2-3.
15. See id. at 2; JAMES H. AMOS, JR., T1-E COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO FRANCHISING
5 (2005).
16. BUSHEL, supra note 12, at 3.
17. Id.
18. AMOS, supra note 15, at 15.
19. Id. at 5-6.
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in 1958.20 Since then, the franchising model has not only become more
popular, but has also posed new problems with the sophistication of play-
ers, legislative growth in antitrust, competition, and contract laws, and the
increasing influence of technology and intellectual property rights.
Franchising is now regulated both at the state and federal level, but this
was not the case until the 1970s. 21 The explosive growth of franchising,
which really began gaining momentum in the 1950s and 1960s, exper-
ienced several ups and downs, and consequentially led to important legal
and regulatory developments in the franchise industry.22 The industry
had a very impressive and steady growth chart during the 1950s and
1960s, and reported that its revenue growth over the fifteen-year period
from 1955-1970 was at a striking 3,600 percent.23 However, by the end of
the 1960s, the franchising system and protocols adopted by the players
started to show some weaknesses and flaws.24 Several lawsuits, big and
small, including class actions, were filed against the franchisors, and most
cases pointed to the "pervasive power of [franchisor] control" over the
disclosure of information; ease of entry into the franchise industry, cou-
pled with the lack of adequate capital and/or experience among franchis-
ees; undefined franchise relationship terms regarding termination,
cancellation, and renewal of the contract; or simply the widespread ex-
ploitative practices adopted by the franchisor.25 While the federal legisla-
tors showed reluctance in legislating concrete disclosure requirements
and business practices for franchising, some of the state legislators re-
acted positively to the urgent need for franchise regulation. 26 In 1971,
California became one of the first states to enact a franchise disclosure
law, and several other states followed its lead. 27 Finally, in 1979, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FIFC) enacted the federal franchise regulation
titled "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchis-
20. DAVID JOHN COLE 1T AI.., ENCYCLOPELI)IA Or MOI)RN EVERYDAY INVlNTIONS
13 (2003).
21. See William L. Killion, The Modern Myth of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case
for a More Balanced View of the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 28
FRANCIIISE L.J. 23, 27 (Summer 2008).
22. See id. at 25-26.
23. Id. at 25.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 26. Many experts analyzed the franchise market, and criticized the
franchisors' operations and the bargaining inequality between the franchisors and
the uninformed franchisees. See id. at 23. New York Attorney General Louis Lef-
kowitz's investigations into the franchising trend discovered that in most of the
franchise arrangements, franchisees were investing their life savings in franchises,
which were actually "fly-by-night operations." Id. at 26. News articles also
pointed out that the franchisors used skillful pressure tactics to convince inexperi-
enced persons to invest monies, without much disclosure of business operation
details. Sylvia Porter, Franchising Frauds' Flood Post Office, SARASOTA-HERALD
TRIBUN17, May 10, 1971, at 11 A. There were also class actions filed by the franchis-
ees, the most publicized being Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., where the Court
found the franchisor engaged in an illegal tying arrangement. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.
1971).
26. See Killion, supra note 21, at 27.
27. California Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § 31000 (1971).
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ing and Business Opportunity Ventures," commonly known as the "FIC
Rule," to regulate the franchise industry and protect the franchisees'
interests.28
II. FEDERAL & STATE LAWS ON FRANCHISING
A. FEDERAL FRANCHISING LAW
Currently, the franchising laws regulate two areas of franchise practice:
(1) the disclosure requirements prescribed at the federal level and the
registration, notice, and additional disclosure requirements prescribed at
the state level for the offer and sale of the franchise; and (2) the relation-
ship laws adopted by some states that govern the on-going relationship
between the franchisor and franchisee. 29 To offer a franchising opportu-
nity to a prospective franchisee, the franchisor generally has to comply
with both federal and state laws, in addition to any industry-specific
regulations. 30
The FTC Rule, promulgated in 1979, required the franchisor of a
franchise operation to make disclosures of twenty-three items to the fran-
chisee by way of the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) at the
first face-to-face meeting or at least ten days prior to signing the franchise
agreement with the franchisee.31 Among other pertinent information,
the disclosure items included information on the franchised business and
its operations, the franchisor's litigation history, the franchisor's financial
representation, and past and present franchisees. 32 The FTIC Rule was
enacted in response to widespread fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair trade
practices adopted by several franchisors across the country.33 The pri-
mary purpose of mandating the timely disclosures was (1) to ensure that
the prospective franchisee has all the available information and resources
needed to make an informed decision about investing in a particular
franchise; and (2) to discourage the franchisor from engaging in high-
pressure tactics and provide the franchisee with a "cooling-off" period
before signing the franchise agreement.34
The franchisors continued to make the mandated disclosures under the
UFOC until July 1, 2008, when the Amended FTC Rule of 2007 came
into effect.35 Under the Amended FTC Rule, the FIC modified its origi-
nal rule to align the disclosure requirements with those of the states.36
28. Killion, supra note 21, at 28.
29. See id.
30. Lederman, supra note 11, at 37. Some industries such as automotive, petroleum,
soft drinks, alcohol may be subject to industry-specific state and federal laws, in
addition, to the franchise statutes. Id.
31. 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1979); Lederman, supra note 11, at 36.
32. Id.
33. See Lederman, supra note 11, at 35-36.
34. Franchise Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,294, 57,301 (proposed Oct. 22, 1999).
35. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 16 C.F.R.
§ 436 (2007); Lederman, supra note 11, at 36.
36. 16 C.F.R. § 436-37.
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The Amended FTC rule requires disclosure of information in twenty-
three specific categories under a disclosure document called the
"Franchise Disclosure Document" (FDD).37 Such disclosures are re-
quired to be made fourteen days prior to signing any agreement or paying
any consideration. 38 In addition, the franchisor is required to furnish exe-
cuted copies of the agreement at least seven days before signing where
the franchisor has made changes to the agreement not initiated by the
franchisee. 39 Further, the franchisor is also required to make supplemen-
tal disclosures to update his disclosure within 120 days after the close of
the franchisor's fiscal year and quarterly, where there have been any ma-
terial changes to the information disclosed under the FDD.40
The FDD calls for information on the following:
* Background on the franchisor, its parents, predecessors, and affili-
ates; business experience; and litigation and bankruptcy history
(Items 1-4)
* Fees to be paid to the franchisor and estimate of initial investment
(Items 5-7)
* Restrictions on sources of products & services and territorial re-
strictions; franchisor's obligations; assistance by franchisor, training,
advertising; financing (Items 9-12)
* Intellectual property: trademarks, copyrights, and patents (Items
13-14)
* Franchisee's obligations, restrictions on sales; provisions regarding
renewal, termination, transfer, and dispute resolution; and public
figures (Items 15-18)
* Financial performance representations (Item 19)
* Franchisee information (Item 20)
* Financial statements (Item 21)
* Contracts (Item 22)
" Receipts (Item 23)4 1
Of all the disclosure items, one of the most notably disputed items is
Item 19, financial performance representations.42 Financial performance
representations usually deal with the sales or earnings projections made
by the franchisor with respect to the franchised business. 43 The
franchisor is not required to make performance representations in the
FDD, and if it chooses not to, then the franchisor is strictly prohibited
from making these representations in any other place or form-be it ne-
37. Id. § 436.
38. Id. § 436.2(a).
39. Id. at 436.2(b).
40. Id. at 436.7.
41. Id. at 436.5.
42. See Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed.
Reg. 15444 (Mar. 30, 2007).
43. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s)(3).
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gotiations, marketing materials or even sales discussions." Moreover, if
no representations are made under Item 19 of the FDD, then the
franchisor is even prohibited from discussing actual sales or revenues.
45
On the other hand, if the franchisor does elect to make any financial per-
formance representations, the franchisor is required to have made them
on a "reasonable basis," and corroborate with written substantiations for
such representation upon request.46 While this standard makes Item 19
disclosure complicated, the legislators wanted to make sure that the
franchisors do not relay any misleading information, which includes mis-
representations, overstatements, or false promises that attempt to portray
untrue prospects of the franchise to the franchisees.
The disclosure responsibility and the protections under the FTC rule
are only applicable to a business relationship that falls within the defini-
tion of a "franchise" under the rule.47 A "franchise" under the rule is
defined as a business or commercial relationship that has the following
three elements:
(1) Trademark: the franchisor grants the franchisee the right to oper-
ate a business identified by the franchisor's trademark and to use
the trademark in conducting the franchisee's business operations;
(2) Control: the franchisor exerts or has the right to exert a significant
degree of control over or provide significant assistance to the fran-
chisee's business operations; and
(3) Consideration: the franchisee promises to pay the franchisor $500
or more in exchange for the right to operate the franchise.
48
All franchisors offering franchises in the United States have to comply
with the Amended FTC Rule and make the mandated disclosures to the
prospective franchisee before the sale is consummated. Failure to comply
with the Amended FTC disclosure requirements could result in civil pen-
alties of up to $16,000 per violation.49 However, the federal law does not
call for registration of the franchise or the filing of the FDD.
50
B. STATES ON FRANCHISING REGULATION
As for the pre-sale requirements, most states have disclosure, registra-
tion, and/or notice requirements. The Amended FTC Rule does not pre-
empt the stricter state disclosure laws, meaning that depending upon the
regulations of the states having jurisdiction over a particular franchising
offering, the franchisor may have to make additional disclosures and
comply with other formalities beyond the requirements under the
44. See N. AM. SEC. ADM'RS ASS'N, INC., 2008 FRANCHISE REGISTRATION AND Dis-
CLOSURE GUIDELINES 58 (Aug. 6, 2011), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/6-2008UFOC.pdf [hereinafter NASAA].
45. See id. at 57-58.
46. Id. at 58.
47. See 16 C.F.R. § 436; Lederman, supra note 11, at 36-37.
48. 16 C.F.R. § 436.1(h).
49. 16 C.F.R. § 1.98.
50. See 16 C.F.R. § 436; NASSA, supra note 44, at 1.
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Amended FTC Rule.5 1
Registration states typically require a pre-offer review and approval
process of a registration application. 52 All registration states require the
registration application form in the FDD format as prescribed under the
Amended FTC Rule discussed above.53 Some states have prescribed fur-
ther disclosures, in addition to those mandated under the Amended FTC
Rule. 54 The examiners of the governing state authority conduct a merit
review of the application and advise the franchisor of their approval or
need for amending the application. 55 The following states require regis-
tration of the offering: California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Virginia, and Washington. 56 In most of these states, the
franchisor is prohibited from selling or offering the franchise for sale until
the registration application has been approved or the franchisor has been
granted exemption. 57 The franchisor is also required to pay a registration
fee at the time of application. 5 8
On the other hand, the notice states prescribe a less time-consuming
and simpler process. These states typically require the franchisor to com-
plete and file the respective state's notice application form, however, they
do not call for the filing of the FDD prepared under the Amended FTC
Rule.59 Also, there is no merit review of these applications and hence,
the process is very straightforward.60 States that follow this approach in-
clude Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, Texas, and Utah.6'
While the filing is usually a one-time filing, some states such as Florida
and Utah require annual filings. 62 Until the notice application forms are
filed properly, the franchisor in these states is prohibited from selling or
offering for sale any franchise offering.63
Whether a business relationship or business model constitutes a
franchise largely depends upon the applicable state's definition of a
"franchise." Similar to the Amended FTC Rule definition of a
"franchise," most states typically have the three elements within their
51. 16 C.F.R. § 436.10.
52. JOEL R. BUCKBERG & DAVID J. KAUFMAN, FRANCHISE SALES AND DISCLOSURE
LAWS AT 49TH ANNUAl CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FRANCHISING AS-
SOCIATION 6 (Feb. 14-17, 2009), available at http://www.franchise.org/uploaded
Files/Franchise.Industry/Events/Sales%2OCompliance% 20Summit.pdf.
53. NASAA, supra note 44, at 1.
54. See generally BUCKBERG & KAUFMAN, supra note 52.
55. Id. at 25.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id. at 41.
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definition of the term.64 The definition usually involves a written or oral
agreement under which: (1) the franchisor grants the franchisee the right
to engage in the business of offering, selling or distributing goods or ser-
vices under the franchisor's marketing plan or business format; (2) the
franchisee's operation of such business or marketing plan is associated
with the franchisor's trademark or other commercial symbol; and (3) in
exchange, the franchisee is required to pay consideration in the form of
fee and/or royalties.65 As under the federal law, the states also require
that all elements of the definition be present for the business to constitute
a franchise under state law.66
To determine what disclosure laws the franchisor is required to comply
with, the franchisor would need to inquire which states have jurisdiction
over the franchise offering.67 Whether a franchise sales activity triggers a
particular state's franchise regulations may depend on several factors
such as whether:
(1) The offer to sell originates in the state
(2) The offer to sell is directed to the state
(3) The acceptance of the offer is made in the state
(4) The franchisor domiciles in the state
(5) The franchisee resides in the state
(6) The proposed franchise will be located or operated in the state or
the sales territory granted to the franchisee will fall within the
state.68
Considering these factors, there may be scenarios where the franchisor
would come within the purview of more than one state and would be
responsible for complying with registration, disclosure, and/or notice re-
quirements of multiple states to avoid penalties.
69
C. EXEMPTIONS FROM DISCLOSURES
While the rule of thumb is that a franchisor is obligated to make disclo-
sures under the Amended FTC Rule and the applicable state's registra-
tion and notice regulations, exemptions from these disclosures have been
promulgated both at the federal and the state level.70 But there may be
situations where the franchisor is able to seek exemption at the state level
but would still have to comply with the FFC disclosure requirements, or
64. See Thomas M. Pitegoff & W. Michael Garner, Brief History and Overview of
Franchise Relationship Laws, in FUNDAMENTALS OF, FRANCHISING 188 (Rupert M.
Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008).
65. Id. at 188-89.
66. Id.
67. Rochelle B. Spandorf & Mark B. Forseth, Franchise Registration, in FUNDAMEN-




70. Judith M. Bailey & Dennis E. Wieczorek, Franchise Disclosure Issues, in FUNDA-
MENTALS oF FRANCHISING 97-98 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds.,
3d ed. 2008).
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vice versa.71 The Amended FTC Rule provides exemptions primarily for
three types of franchisee sales: (1) sale to a large franchisee that has a net
worth of at least $5 million and has been in the business for at least five
years; (2) sale to a party related to franchisors, i.e., where the franchisee
has been part of the franchisor's management for at least two years, and
either owns at least fifty percent interest in the franchise and/or twenty-
five percent equity interest in the franchisor; and (3) sales in which the
franchisee has a large initial investment of $1 million or more.72 The
states also offer exemptions to large, experienced franchisors, franchisees
that are part of the franchisor's management, and sophisticated franchis-
ees, such as financial institutions or high net worth or net income individ-
uals. 73 Also, some states exempt transactions for sale, renewal, or
extension of an existing franchise, where there are no material changes in
the agreement terms or where the franchisee sells on his account.74
D. FRANCHISING RELATIONSHIP LAWS
The "state relationship laws govern post-sale relationship and franchise
contract issues. ''75 Several states and U.S. territories, such as Arkansas,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washing-
ton, Wisconsin, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, have enacted rela-
tionship laws.76 These states have created better protection for
franchisees against the abuse of the franchisor, who is usually the party
represented by counsel that often drafts the franchise agreement. 77 The
relationship laws typically deal with various facets of issues arising during
the term of a franchise agreement, such as termination and renewal pro-
visions, assignment and transfer of a franchise, restriction of free associa-
tion of franchisees, repurchase of the remaining inventory by the
franchisor upon the termination of the franchise, encroachment by the
franchisor, and termination only with good cause. 78 To avoid future dis-
putes and participation in unfair practices, it is imperative that the
franchisors comply with their relationship obligations to the franchisee in
accordance with the applicable state relationship laws.
71. Id. at 98-99.
72. 16 C.F.R. § 436.8.
73. BUCKBERG & KAUFMANN, supra note 52, at 35-38.
74. Id. at 38.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Pitegoff & Garner, supra note 64 at 187 n.7.
77. Id. at 186-87.
78. Id. at 187.
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III. FRANCHISING & INTERPLAY WITH OTHER LAWS
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & FRANCHISING
Intellectual property, particularly in the form of trademark, trade
dress, and copyright, plays a very important role in replicating successful
business models through franchising. In a franchising transaction, a ma-
jor part of what the franchisor is selling and what the franchisee is buying
is "the brand," or the so-called goodwill of the franchisor. 79 The brand
most prominently involves the franchisor's name-the trademark-but it
may also have various other intellectual property assets that support and
nurture the brand, such as use of the trade dress (the exterior or interior
appearance of a restaurant), copyrights (the manuals and brochure
materials), business systems, logos, patents, and designs.80 These assets
are essential for the franchisor in selling its brand to the franchisee and
for the franchisee in selling the brand to the public. Therefore, it is imper-
ative that the intellectual property assets associated with the franchise are
properly identified, created, owned, protected, and commercialized for
the success of all-the franchise, the franchisor, and the franchisee.
1. Trademarks
A trademark may be a word, symbol, name, device or a combination of
these, which a merchant uses to identify and distinguish his products from
the products sold by the other merchants in the market. 8 1 The scope of
what features of a product could be termed as its trademark is not restric-
tive-it could be phrases, color, or any other characteristic, provided the
mark identifies the source of the product and sufficiently distinguishes it
from the other brands. 82 For example, the phrase "Just Do It" is a slogan
that is commonly associated with Nike and distinguishes it from its other
competitors such as Reebok or Puma. Trademark protection works for
the benefit of the consumers and society-it promotes competition and
maintains product quality. Where the brand uses distinctive design fea-
tures in the appearance or image of the product, for example, the use of
colors in product packaging or the design of a store, to distinguish itself
from the rest of the brands, these features typically falls under the defini-
tion of trade dress. 83 Trade dress is often an important asset in franchis-
ing business, especially in restaurant franchising, where the brand is
associated with the interior and exterior d6cor and appearance of the res-
taurant, the design of the menu, and the packaging of the food items.
84
79. Steward Hershman & Andrew A. Caffey, Structuring a Unit Franchise Relation-
ship, in FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 62 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C.
Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008).
80. Id. at 67.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
82. William A. Finkelstein & Christopher P. Bussert, Trademark Law Fundamentals
and Related Franchising Issues, in FUNDAMErrALS OF FRANCHISING 3 (Rupert M.
Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008).
83. RLSTATIEMENT (TrnRn) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (1995).
84. Finkelstein & Bussert, supra note 82, at 47.
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Trademarks are regulated both at the state and federal level. At the
federal level, the most prominent statute that governs trademarks is the
Lanham Act.85 Franchisors who wish to obtain federal registration of
their trademarks have to submit their application to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).8 6 To be eligible for registration,
the registrant has to show that the mark is distinctive and used or in-
tended to be used in commerce. 87 Also, the Lanham Act lays down statu-
tory restrictions and refuses registration of marks that may be immoral,
scandalous, deceptive, or falsely suggest connection with persons, living
or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into con-
tempt or disrepute. 88 Also, the marks, which are merely descriptive, i.e.,
describe the products rather than say what they are, are not eligible for
registration until they attain secondary meaning by gaining market
recognition.8 9
Although registration of a trademark is not essential to protect the
right in itself, it is the preferred practice among most franchisors.90 The
right to a trademark can also be obtained without registration, provided
the owner is the first to use the distinctive mark in commerce. 91 Unregis-
tered trademarks may be eligible to receive protection under state com-
mon law.92 However, this protection is limited to the specific geographic
area in which the trademark was first put to use in commerce. 93 On the
other hand, registration of a trademark with the USPTO gives the owner
the right to use the mark nationwide, except in the specific geographic
area where it was already being used by another entity.94 Further, regis-
tration of the trademark stands as nationwide constructive notice of the
owner's right to the trademark and also makes the trademark owner eligi-
ble to file suit in case of infringement in the federal court and claim treble
damages and other remedies under the Lanham Act.95
Because trademarks are typically the most important asset of a
franchising unit, it is imperative that franchisors as well as the franchisees
ensure that the rights to the trademark are intact. Sometimes, the rights
to a trademark can be lost due to discontinued use for a prolonged period
(three years or more), abandonment, improper licensing or loss of origi-
85. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72 (2008).
86. Id. § 1051(a)(1).
87. Id. § 1052.
88. Id.
89. Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1938). Secondary meaning
is acquired distinctiveness, where the mark "has become distinctive, in that, as a
result of its use, prospective purchasers have come to perceive it as a designation
that identifies goods, services, businesses, or members..." RESTATEMENT (Tinr)
OF UNFAIR COMP.ITTON § 13(b).
90. Finkelstein & Bussert, supra note 82, at 5-6.
91. 15 USC § 1151(b)(5); ADAM L. BROOKMAN, TRADEMARK LAW: PROTECTION, EN-
FORCEMFENI, AND LICENSING § 10.02[A] (1999).
92. Finkelstein & Bussert, supra note 82, at 22-23.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 25.
95. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1117, 1121.
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nal distinctiveness of the mark.96 To avoid losing the trademark, it is par-
ticularly important in the franchising arena for the franchisor to properly
grant the license to use trademark to the licensor.97 This entails exercis-
ing adequate quality control of the products distributed by the franchisee
to ensure that the distinctive quality and image of the product matches
that of the brand. 98
2. Copyrights
Copyright is an expression of idea or ideas in a tangible form that can
be perceived, reproduced or communicated through a device or ma-
chine.99 Copyright protects vast variety of original works of authorship-
literary works, musical works, dramatic works, pictorial and graphic
works, motion pictures, audiovisual works, sound recordings, and archi-
tectural works.1°° In a franchising model, copyright protection could be
sought in many operational aspects-in the operations and training
manuals, program or advertising brochures, menu cards, proprietary busi-
ness systems, or a musical advertising jingle. It is to be noted that copy-
right only protects the expression of ideas, not the ideas.10 1 Hence, a
right in the copyright of the franchisor's training manual, for example,
protects the duplication of the expression of those training systems and
not the systems themselves. To prevent competitors from copying his sys-
tem, the franchisor would have to protect it as a trade secret.
In franchising, the franchisor grants copyright licenses to the franchisee
as a part of the business model. 102 A franchisee receiving a copyright
license could receive the right to reproduce the copyrighted work, create
derivative works, or perform the work. 10 3 Such licenses could either be
exclusive or non-exclusive, however an exclusive license to use the copy-
right must be in writing and signed by the owner. 1°4
Copyright protection is afforded to unregistered copyrights or even
where the copyright notice is not provided on the copyrighted work.
10 5
Basically, copyright protection is available to all works of authorship,
provided they are original.' 0 6 All copyrighted works are afforded protec-
tion for the term of the author's life plus an additional seventy years after
96. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 19, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 1.L.M. 1197.
97. Finkelstein & Bussert, supra note 82, at 41.
98. Id. at 42.
99. 17 USC § 102 (1976).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Ian Cockburn, Franchising & Licensing - What Are They and How Can You Ben-
efit from Them?, WORLD INTELILECTUAL PROP. ORG., www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/sme/en/documents/pdf/franchising.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
103. 17 USC § 201(d) (1976).
104. Id. § 204(a).
105. Id. §§ 405, 408.
106. See id. § 102.
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the death of the author.'0 7
While registration of copyright is optional, a franchisor and franchisee
may choose to register the copyright with the Copyright Office. 10 8 Regis-
tration establishes a public record of the copyright claim.109 Moreover,
registration is required before the owner can file an infringement suit.110
Further, registration of the copyright will also allow the owner to claim
additional remedies such as statutory damages and attorney fees in case
of an infringement lawsuit."'
B. FRANCHISING & ANTITRUST LAWS
Antitrust law regulates all relationships among competitors and be-
tween the businesses and the consumers, with the primary purpose of
promoting competition for the benefit of the consumers." 2 In franchis-
ing, the antitrust laws commonly regulate three broad categories of
conduct:
1. Tying Agreements
In a franchising transaction, the franchisors primarily sell to the
franchisor the right to distribute its products using the associated trade-
mark and the business model of the franchisor. The franchisee believes in
the competitive strength of the franchisor's trademark, and thus elects to
invest his resources in running the franchised business. The consumers
possibly buy the product from the franchise for the quality offered under
the franchisor's trademark. 113 Given that, it becomes imperative to main-
tain the original brand image of the trademark. To maintain his trade-
mark's brand image and receive the consumers' continued business, the
franchisor puts in place quality controls. One such quality control effort
is known as a tying arrangement, where the franchisor mandates that the
franchisee buy certain supplies and materials required in the franchise's
operations from the franchisor or designated suppliers.' 14 While the
franchisor may reason that this control is necessary to maintain consis-
tency in quality of the final product brought to the market, the franchisor
may have ulterior motives through this tying arrangement. It would have
the benefit of having a ready market and opportunity to charge marked-
up prices for the tied products to the franchisee, who is now obligated to
pay the higher price. Alternatively, the franchisor may earn kickbacks
107. Id. § 302.
108. Id. §408.




112. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890; Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1914); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1914).
113. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 955 (1972).
114. Robert T. Joseph & Lee N. Abrams, Antitrust Law, in FUNDAMENTALS OF"
FRANCHISING 259 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden eds., 3d ed. 2008).
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from the designated suppliers for having his franchisee buy the supplies
from them. In both scenarios, the franchisor places restraints on trade
and competition. It places restrictions on the franchisee's right to choose
as to who he could buy the supplies from and also obstructs market entry
for new suppliers, thereby suppressing competition.
While tying arrangements are not per se illegal, federal courts have
found tying arrangements illegal in some scenarios.' 15 The statutes that
prohibit tie-ins are Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the
Clayton Act. 116 The Sherman Act provision focuses on regulating any
actions "in restraint of trade" and the Clayton Act provision prohibits
any conduct that substantially lessens competition. 117 To state a tying
claim, the franchisee would have to show that (1) the tied products are
two distinct products and the franchisor has tied the sale of these two
products; (2) the franchisor has "appreciable economical power" in the
tying market such that the franchisor has the power to force the fran-
chisee to make the purchase of the tied product; and (3) the arrangement
has an effect on the substantial volume of commerce in the tied product
market." 8 If the trademark of the product is only remotely related to the
alleged tied products, the courts, as in the case Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., are bound to find that the two products tied together are distinct and
separate.1 9 In Siegel, the court found an illegal tying arrangement where
some miscellaneous items, which did not have any special design nor
uniquely supported the franchise brand, were tied to the licensing of
trademark. 120 On the other hand, the franchisor Baskin-Robbins' policy
of requiring the franchisee to buy the ice cream to be sold at the franchise
from the franchisor itself was not found to be an illegal tying arrangement
because the court found that the quality of the ice cream and the brand
image of Baskin-Robbins trademark was so "inextricably interrelated" in
the consumer's minds.
2 1
Also, whether a trademark was separate from the alleged tied product
depends upon the type of franchising. For example, under a business for-
mat system, the franchisor merely provides the business format and the
franchisee is usually responsible for manufacturing and distributing the
product. Under this system, the franchisee could use a component of his
choice, provided the quality of the end product correctly reflects the
franchisor's trademark. For example, in Siegel, the court found that the
franchisor could not coerce the franchisee to buy cooking equipment, pa-
per packaging and food mixes that were purchased from the market and
resold to the franchisee. 1 22 But, in a distribution format, the goods are
115. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972).
116. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C § 14.
117. Id.
118. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992).
119. 448 F.2d 43.
120. Id. at 46.
121. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir. 1982).
122. Siegel, 448 F.2d at 47-49.
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either manufactured by the franchisor or by the franchisee as per the
franchisor's secret formula or specifications, as is the case with brands
such as Coca-Cola. Under this format, it is undeniably important for the
franchisor to have the franchisee distribute the exact product to maintain
the goodwill and value of the attached trademark, and courts are there-
fore reluctant to find tying arrangements illegal.
As for proving the franchisor's market power, uniqueness of a distinc-
tive trademark is not sufficient evidence. But, courts have held that mar-
ket power can be inferred in a lock-in case under the Kodak lock-in
theory, where upon purchasing one product, the franchisee is locked-in to
buying another.'2 3 Sometimes, the franchisor allows the franchisee,
under the franchise agreement, the liberty to purchase from a list of ap-
proved suppliers. Subsequently, post-contract the franchisor changes its
policy and designates a specific supplier for the franchisee to purchase the
necessary supplies from. A similar situation arose in a rather recent case,
Burda v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc.124 In Burda, Wendy's International, the fast-
food franchisor, initially had a list of approved suppliers from whom the
franchisee could request bids for purchase of food products. 2 5 Post-con-
tract, Wendy's changed its purchase policy, and coerced the franchisee,
under the threat of termination, to purchase from the designated supplier
or be charged a surcharge fee. 126 Relying on the Kodak lock-in theory,
the franchisee brought an illegal tying claim against the franchisor, and
the court agreed with the franchisee. 2 7 Distinguishing the franchise
agreement in Burda from the one in Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's
Pizza, Inc., where the franchisor had informed the franchisee about the
potential exclusive purchasing agreements prior to getting locked-in the
contract, the court in Burda found that the franchise agreement did not
give notice of the exclusive purchase arrangements prior to contracting,
but instead misled the franchisee into thinking that competition was
open. 28
2. Resale Price Maintenance
Can franchisors control the resale prices of the products sold by the
franchisee? Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., it was per se illegal for franchisors to
set resale prices for their own products. 129 However, the Supreme Court
in Leegin held that vertical price controls are not per se illegal and would
have to be analyzed under the rule of reason, i.e. the vertical price con-
trols should not unreasonably restrain trade nor substantially harm com-
123. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477-78.
124. 659 F.Supp.2d 928 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
125. Id. at 931.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 935.
128. Burda, 659 F.Supp.2d 935-37; Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124
F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997).
129. 551 U.S. 877, 877 (2007).
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petition in the market.130 Hence, in a franchising context, the franchisor
would have to show that the price controls do not substantially hinder
competition and possibly show that the price controls in fact have a pro-
competition effect. Moreover, the vertical price controls may require fur-
ther analysis where the franchisor is involved in dual distribution, i.e.,
where the franchisor has company-owned outlets and competes against
the franchisee. 31 In such scenarios, any resale price agreements between
franchisor and franchisee may be considered to be horizontal agreements
among competitors to fix prices and would be illegal. 132
3. Exclusive Dealings
Exclusive dealings arrangements are entered in a franchising set-up to
ensure that the franchisee does not sell products of competing brands.
While it seems obvious that a franchisor's demand for the franchisee's
loyalty to his trademark is an important business consideration, some-
times a franchisor goes beyond what is necessary, often stifling competi-
tion. Exclusive dealings stand in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, where the franchisor imposing the
exclusive dealing restriction has a significant market share or control to
impede businesses to enter or exist in the market, and thereby forecloses
the consumer's access to competitive products.133 The key inquiry is
whether the exclusivity provision in the franchise agreement in fact sub-
stantially forecloses competition in the market.
IV. FRANCHISEE-AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR OR
AN EMPLOYEE?
Franchisor and franchisee are generally presumed to be two indepen-
dent work units. But recent court decisions have attacked this presump-
tion and challenged the franchising model in general.' 34 The question
that has sent chills down the spines of several franchisors is whether fran-
chisees are independent contractors or the franchisor's employees. Sev-
eral courts have found that they are in fact employees.1 35 If the
franchisor is found to be a putative employer of the franchisee, the effect
on the franchisor can be extremely devastating and expensive. The
130. Id. at 877-78.
131. Quentin R. Wittrock & Jeremy L. Johnson, Can Franchisors Control Franchisee
Prices?, 28 FRANCIlSi- L. 199, 199 (Spring 2009).
132. Id. Horizontal price agreements are per se illegal. Leegin 551 U.S. at 877.
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14.
134. See, e.g., Awuah v. Coverall N. Am. Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83-84 (D. Mass.
2010); De Giovanni v. Jani-King, Int'l, Inc., 262 F.R.D. 71, 84-86 (D. Mass. 2009);
Patterson v. Domino's Pizza LLC, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396, 399 (Ct. App. 2012) (rev.
granted).
135. See, e.g., De Giovanni, 262 F.R.D. at 85 (holding that the franchisees were employ-
ees because the franchisee was found to be conducting the same business as the
franchisor); Patterson, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 399 (holding that the franchisee was
deemed franchisor's agent and the franchisor was also vicariously liable for fran-
chisee's employee's actions of sexual harassment against another co-worker).
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franchisor would not only be responsible for paying back the franchise
fees paid by the franchisee under the franchise agreement and would be
liable to pay worker's compensation, insurance benefits, overtime, em-
ployment tax, but the franchisor could also be held vicariously liable
under the principles of agency law for any acts done by the franchisee or
its agents under this newly found relationship. 136 Moreover, the
franchisors could also be made liable to pay attorney's fees and treble
damages.
There is a growing anxiety among franchisors about the worker status
of the franchisee, as the courts across the nation wrestle with this ques-
tion. A recent decision from a Massachusetts court, which was highly
discussed and publicized, ruled against the franchisor, finding that the
franchisees were employees.' 37 In Awuah v. Coverall North America
Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
franchisor, a commercial cleaning company, had misclassified its franchis-
ees as independent contractors.1 38 The court used the infamous "ABC"
three-prong test for its analysis. 139 Under this test, to prove that a worker
was an independent contractor, the defendant must show that: (1) the
worker performs his services free from control of the defendant; (2) the
services performed are outside the usual course of business of the defen-
dant or outside the overall business of the defendant; and (3) the worker
is customarily engaged in independently-run trade or business of the
same nature as the services provided. 140 The Coverall court relied only
on the second prong and found that Coverall was involved in the same
business as the franchisee. 41 According to the court findings, Coverall
provided employee training, identification badges, and uniforms to the
franchisees.' 42 Moreover, Coverall and not the franchisees was the one
directly contracting with the customers and collecting the bills.' 43 Based
on these facts, the court held that Coverall was involved in the same busi-
ness as the franchisees and the franchisees were in fact employees of
Coverall.' 44
Following the Coverall decision, several other cases have been filed
against franchisors claiming misclassification of the franchisees as inde-
pendent contractors.1 45 It seems that the primary focus of the courts
evaluating these claims has been on the amount of control the franchisor
has over the franchisee's operations and the means used to exercise it.146
136. De Giovanni, 262 F.R.D at 84; Patterson, 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 399.
137. Awuah v. Coverall N. Am. Inc., 707 F.Supp.2d 80, 85 (2010).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 82.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 82-83, 85.
142. Id. at 84.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Juarez v. Jani-King of Cal., Inc., No. 09-3495 SC, 2012 WL 177564, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 23, 2012); Hayes v. Enmon Enters. LLC, No. 3:10-CV-00382-CWR-LRA, 2011
WL 2491375, at *3 (S.D. Miss. June 22, 2011).
146. Juarez, 2012 WL 177564, at *4; Hayes, 2011 WL 2491375, at *3.
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For example, California courts used the control test which, among other
factors, looks at whether the principal has the authority to terminate, the
level of skill required, the supplier of tools and other instrumentalities,
the length of time for which services are to be performed, the discretion
to hire or fire, and the amount of supervision required. 147 The District
Court of Mississippi also applied a similar ten-factor control test in Hayes
v. Enmon Enterprises, LLC, finding that while the franchise agreement
termed the franchisee as an independent contractor, the terms of the
agreement were akin to an employee-employer relationship.1
48
The IFA argues that the Coverall court's ABC test, which is followed
by many states across the nation, does not account for the "symbiotic
relationship" shared in a franchising relationship and has appealed to
states across the nation for legislative changes.149 The IFA argues that
most franchising arrangements would fail on all three prongs of the
test. 150 It contends that franchisors are legally required to enforce ade-
quate controls over the franchisees' operations to maintain its trade-
mark. 1 51 Moreover, the franchisor is often involved in the same business
in which it has corporate-owned units as well. 152 Finally, the nature of
franchising arrangement is such that the franchisee is dependent upon the
franchisor's trademark to continue its operations and would not be able
to operate if the trademark is withdrawn upon the termination of the
franchise relationship. 153 To protect the franchising industry, the IFA has
appealed to several states, including Georgia, Delaware, Indiana, Massa-
chusetts and Nebraska for legislative changes. Of these states, Georgia
and Delaware have more recently passed legislation specifically announc-
ing that franchisees are independent contractors and not franchisor's
employees. 154
There certainly is a tug of war between the franchisor's concern to
maintain enough control to protect its trademark and his concern to cross
the line and form an employee-employer relationship. But for genuine
business franchisors, where that line could be drawn is a little uncertain.
The recent analysis of this issue suggests that the franchisor should care-
147. Juarez, 2012 WL 177564, at *4.
148. Hayes, 2011 WL 2491375, at *3 (finding that there was a genuine issue of material
fact for the jury to decide on the relationship between the franchisor and fran-
chisee, as there were conflicting factors in the franchise agreement).
149. Dean Heyl, Franchisees are Independent Contractors, But Not as Easy as "ABC" in
Some States, FRANCHISING WORILD (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.franchise
.org/Franchise-lndustry-News-Detai.aspx?id=58705.
150. Id.
151. Id. (noting that franchisors, as trademark owners, have a fiduciary duty to protect
their trademark and enforce quality controls).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., H.B. 55, 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2011) available at http://openstates
.org/de/bills/147/HB55/documentsDED00003458/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014); H.B.
548, 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/
Legislation/20112012/126994.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2014).
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fully provide adequate control to the franchisees both under the agree-
ment and in practice.
V. PRE- & POST-TERMINATION ISSUES
Termination of a franchising arrangement can be carried out under a
mutual agreement or at the choice of one of the parties. If under the
latter scenario, this could raise either a pre- or post-termination dispute,
or both.
Franchising arrangements are usually governed by franchise agree-
ments. Most of the time, the reason for termination could be due to
breach of the contract provisions, failure to make royalty payments, non-
adherence to the quality standards, failure to meet reasonable sales goals,
damage to franchisor's trademark or reputation, sale of competitor prod-
ucts, encroachment over franchisee's exclusive territory or discrimination
by franchisor, non-renewal of franchise agreements, or breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 155 Upon a breach, the ag-
grieved party may proceed with a default or termination. 156 But many
times the agreements do not address all the issues. The party should then
investigate if any state relationship laws would apply and provide a rem-
edy.157 At present, there are nineteen states, other than Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands, that have enacted laws addressing franchise ter-
minations.' 58 To determine which state's law applies, the franchisor must
identify if there is any choice-of-forum or choice-of-law clause governing
state law.' 59 In the absence of such a clause, the party shall determine the
jurisdiction based on the states' jurisdictional laws, if any, or otherwise if
the franchise outlet is located in that state.' 60
Prior to termination of the franchise relationship, the terminating party
should conform to the mandated procedures. The party would have to
comply with the all formalities under the franchise agreement provisions
and/or state relationship laws. In this regard, some states require that
franchisors have good cause before terminating, send notices of default to
franchise, provide cure periods, and send notice of terminations. 16' To
155. CHRISTINI E. CONNELLY, Rom-R'r LiCItrITENSTEIN, & M. EuZAnlIF' MOORE,
INT'L FRANCHISE ASS'N, FRANCHISE DEFAULT AN) TERMINATION-BEsT PRAC-





158. Id. at 11.
159. It should be noted that choice-of-forum clauses are more readily enforced by many
jurisdictions versus choice-of-law clauses, where the court commonly requires that
the parties establish connections with the designated state. See Jonathan Klick,
Bruce Kobayashi, & Larry Ribstein, Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of
Franchise Termination, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 355, 367-68 (2009), availa-
ble at https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/jklick/workingpapers/3Entrepreneurial
BusLJ355(2009).pdf.
160. CONNELLY, LICHTENSTEIN, & MOORE, supra note 155, at 12.
161. Id. at 13.
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avoid any penalties, the terminating party will have to review and comply
with the applicable obligations.
One of the more common post-termination issues arises with regard to
non-compete covenants. Non-compete covenants protect the franchisor's
legitimate business interest in preserving its goodwill and stopping com-
petition. These covenants gain more importance, especially in reference
to post-termination period and are incorporated in most franchising
agreements. By including non-competition clauses, a franchisor can pro-
tect its trademarks, trade secrets, goodwill, market share, and protect it-
self and its other franchisees from unfair competition. While assessing
the non-compete covenants, courts usually enquire if the covenant is
"reasonable." 162 Reasonableness, in this context, refers to the length of
time or the coverage of the restricted area, and is determined on a case-
by-case basis. 163 If the non-compete is found to be reasonable, it can be
enforced not only against the signatory but sometimes also against non-
signatories, who are operating the competing business. In such cases, the
non-signatory is usually a family member of the signatory, who acts in
concert with, aids, or abets the breaching franchisee.
164
CONCLUSION
Franchising offers franchisors, as well as franchisees, a mechanism to
access opportunities of success. Moreover, the franchising model has
proven successful even in the tough economic market, and has probably
shown that it is a rather secure technique of running a business. But the
parties to a franchise agreement often struggle to strike the right balance
between the somewhat conflicting desires of the franchisor and the fran-
chisee. While the franchisor wants to adopt standardization and quality
control to maintain its goodwill and brand recognition in the market, the
franchisee is hungry for autonomy and self-control. As each party is re-
sponsible in the success and failure of the relationship, the franchisor
seems to bear the greater onus to comply with the statutory regulations as
well as maintain a fair paradigm to ensure a successful and rewarding
venture for both the parties.
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs §§ 186, 188 (1981).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., McCart v. H & R Block, Inc., 470 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)
(enforcing the non-compete against the non-signatory spouse because he was
found to have conspired with the franchisee in operating a competitive business);
Michael R. Gray & Jason M. Murray, Covenants Not to Compete and Nonsignato-
ries: Enjoining Unfair Conspiracies, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 9 (Winter 2006).
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